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Since the 1950s, shortly after the Kuomintang (KMT, or NationalistParty) government moved to Taiwan after having suffered defeat inmainland China by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Taiwan has
been under the shadow of military threat from the Chinese People’s Liber-
ation Army (PLA). In the 1980s, as mainland China began to open and re-
form, prioritising economic development over class warfare and military
strengthening, Taiwan observers came to perceive a decline in the level of
threat posed by the mainland. By the post-Cold War era, however, as Tai-
wan democratised, perceptions of threat returned and were reinforced by
events such as the 1995/1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, in which China test-fired
ballistic missiles near Taiwan’s main ports and launched live-fire military
exercises in the East China Sea. China’s annual double-digit military budget
growth in the past two decades and successive revelations about newly-
developed high-end weapon systems also contributed to resurgent anxi-
eties about Chinese intentions.
Surprisingly, however, in the mid-2000s, and in spite China’s widely-
recognised comprehensive military modernisation, the PLA’s continuous
deployment of ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan, and Beijing’s refusal to
rule out the possibility of using military force against Taiwan, a new per-
ception began to take root among Taiwanese observers that the likelihood
of cross-Strait military conflict was decreasing. This article argues that the
PRC’s changing policy toward Taiwan combined with the clear US determi-
nation to remain the leading power in the Asia-Pacific has led Taiwanese
analysts to perceive the likelihood of conflict in the near-term as decreas-
ing. This constitutes a major perceptual contrast between long-term threat
and short-term stability.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section deals with Tai-
wan’s threat perceptions of China and the impact these perceptions have
had on the island’s defence posture. The second section focuses on the
shift in China’s military approach towards Taiwan. The third section ana-
lyzes Taiwan’s evolving defence/military strategy toward the decreasing
likelihood of cross-Strait conflict. The final section analyzes Taiwan’s de-
fence modernisation in the face of China’s continuing military threat and
the prospect of cross-Strait confidence building.
Taiwan’s evolving perceptions of the China
threat
Taiwan’s long-held perception of an existential military threat from China
began to abate in the late 1980s, especially after 1987, when the Taiwan
government, pressured by the opposition movement for humanitarian ar-
ticulation, approved home visits for retired soldiers, allowing veterans to
return to their birthplaces in China for the first time in nearly 40 years. This
change of policy on home visits, along with China changing its policy to-
ward Taiwan by advocating “peaceful re-unification under one-country,
two-systems,” ushered in a new stage for Taiwan-China exchanges.
Despite the fact that Taiwan and China started to deal with each other
on functional issues from this point onwards and trade and economic ties
became closer, the two sides’ fundamental political differences remained
unchanged at this stage. (1) Taiwan was actively seeking to improve its in-
ternational status on the grounds that its achievements in economic, po-
litical, and social development should be recognised by the international
community and rewarded with a more normal international status. Fur-
ther, Taiwan under the name of Republic of China (ROC) has long been a
sovereign state, and should be recognised as such with an official represen-
tative in all international organisations. Beijing regarded Taiwan’s endeav-
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ours to achieve international recognition, symbolised most notably by for-
mer President Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝 ) visit to his alma mater Cornell Uni-
versity in 1995 and all-out effort to return to the international community,
as synonymous with the pursuit of “Taiwan independence.” (2)
As such, the incipient cross-Strait cooperation on functional issues sym-
bolised by the Koo-Wang talks in 1993 in Singapore soon broke down, and
the result of this breakdown was the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. (3) In the
wake of Lee’s visit to Cornell, China test fired short-range ballistic missiles
into the sea about 90 miles north of Taipei. The PLA Navy also launched
live fire exercises in the East China Sea. Amphibious landing exercises were
carried out on an island close to Taiwan. China’s state-controlled media
swung into action, roundly condemning Taiwan’s quest for “independence”
and emphatically pointing out that the PLA had the ability to crush Tai-
wan’s attempt if necessary. Although the crisis ended without any direct
military clash, it shocked Taiwan in many ways.
The foremost effect was to drive home Beijing’s willingness to contem-
plate the use of force against Taiwan, dispelling the un-realistic hopes that
had arisen in Taiwan since 1987 that peace in the Taiwan Strait was in-
evitable, and that there was no longer any realistic prospect of armed con-
flict. China’s show of determination reminded Taiwanese observers of Bei-
jing’s willingness to use force to attain its political goals.
A related view around that time was that China had no capability to in-
vade Taiwan. There was a widespread view among Taiwanese analysts prior
to the 1995-96 crisis that the Chinese military could best be described as
having “short arms and slow legs.” (4) This line of analysis implied that the
PLA lacked the capability to invade Taiwan, let alone execute the mission
of the “limited war under high-technology conditions” doctrine.
In the wake of the crisis, Taiwanese analysts’ perceptions of the PLA began
to shift, with more and more observers believing that China would use force
against Taiwan if it felt its interests threatened, regardless of whether or not
the PLA possessed advanced weapons systems in its inventory.
The crisis also affected military planning in Taiwan. While the Chinese
military was not able to cross the Taiwan Strait at this time due to insuffi-
cient amphibious lift capability, and the PLA Air Force was not yet able to
threaten serious damage to Taiwan, China’s growing ballistic missile forces
were providing Beijing with a new tool enabling it to strike Taiwan in ways
that the ROC armed forces could not effectively defend against.
Ballistic missiles represented one of the few pockets of excellence amid
China’s overall quite obsolete weapons systems inventory, and they were
probably the most lethal. (5) With its expanding arsenal of conventional sur-
face-to-surface ballistic missiles, China could target and hold at risk Tai-
wan’s major political and military assets. While questions about the accu-
racy of its missile force persisted, if China launched an all-out assault on
Taiwan’s command and control centres, the possibility existed that these
could be paralysed, if not totally knocked out. Were that to occur, Taiwan
could lose retaliatory capability and might struggle to mount an effective
defence against invasion.
On the basis of the 1995-96 crisis, most Taiwan military analysts con-
cluded that a ballistic missile strike would be the opening act of any future
cross-Strait conflict. Before it committed any other weapons or platforms
to the field of battle, Beijing was likely to try to soften up Taiwan’s defences
using its stand-off strike capabilities, which could easily penetrate Taiwan’s
air defence system. Furthermore, using missiles would be highly cost effec-
tive for China, potentially saving thousands of Chinese soldiers’ lives by
weakening Taiwan’s resistance in the event of an actual conflict. At the
same time, Beijing could exhaust Taiwan’s limited defence procurement re-
sources if it could induce Taiwan to spend heavily on developing and de-
ploying expensive anti-missile systems.
Taiwan’s perception of a threat from China intensified as more informa-
tion about the PLA’s ambitious “strategic modernisation” program became
available. (6) Research has shown that the Chinese military was not content
with developing ballistic missiles alone, but also invested significantly in
acquiring comprehensive information warfare capabilities, in modernising
the PLA’s special forces, in improving China’s electronic warfare and elec-
tronic counter-measures abilities, and in significantly upgrading the PLA’s
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. In other words, Taiwan faces
tremendous challenges from the modernisation investments made by its
chief military threat. As such, Taiwan has to confront a multi-vector mili-
tary challenge, even as doing so could cost it tremendous resources in
terms of defence expenditure. (7)
China has also reportedly explored the possibility of carrying out a de-
capitation strike against Taiwan’s political and military leadership. The risk,
as seen by some analysts, is that the PLA may at some point be able to
shorten the sensor-to-shooter target acquisition and weapons-release
chain, allowing it to execute the kind of long-range precision strike neces-
sary to execute a decapitation attack against Taiwan. (8)
An additional concern noted by US analysts of the PLA stems from the
Chinese military’s development of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabil-
ities. These A2/AD capabilities aim at denying US forces the option of for-
ward-basing and/or sea access so as to prevent the US from intervening in
the Taiwan Strait if military conflict erupted between Taiwan and China. (9)
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China’s A2/AD capability is widely assessed to centre around the acquisition
of intermediate-range anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) able to manoeuvre
after re-entering the atmosphere so as to hit a moving US aircraft carrier. (10)
Previously, many analysts discounted the possibility of employing ASBMs
against US aircraft carrier battle groups due to the technical complexities
of such a task. China’s purported ASBM, the Dongfeng (DF)-21 series mis-
sile, has a reported range of about 2,500 km, and when re-entering the at-
mosphere, its speed would be more than Mach 7.0. (11) At such a high
speed, many defence analysts assessed it to be virtually impossible to ma-
noeuvre the missile’s direction effectively enough to hit a US carrier.
However, it seems that China’s researchers refused to give up the quest
to produce an ASBM and may in fact be on the verge of success. Several
models have been developed, from the DF-21A to the DF-21D, and senior
US military officers appear to believe that these missiles could in fact pose
a threat to US carriers. (12) At a minimum, the PLA’s ASBM program has cre-
ated a psychological effect on US forces and on China’s neighbours, some
of whom may suspect that if the US can be deterred from entering the Tai-
wan Strait area, Washington’s overall determination to remain the leader
of the region itself may also be called into question.
Additionally, China’s refurbishment of the ex-Varyag aircraft carrier, pur-
chased from the Ukraine, has demonstrated its determination to develop
a blue-water navy. (13) While there is little doubt that it will take many
years for China to build and operate an aircraft carrier strike group, news
reports of the refurbishment and possible testing of the carrier have nev-
ertheless generated speculation about the impact on the regional
geostrategic landscape. Additionally, the carrier’s launching has placed psy-
chological pressure on Taiwan, forcing ROC military analysts to ponder
how Taiwan should react if China’s aircraft carrier group should launch mil-
itary action in the waters east of Taiwan.
China drew a number of lessons from the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis,
the most important of which was that the US would intervene in one way
or another if a military conflict erupted in the Taiwan Strait. (14) In light of
this, the PLA needed to prioritise investing heavily in the development of
anti-ship missile capabilities, along with other asymmetric weapons sys-
tems so that the US would be deterred from intervening, or at a minimum
that the cost of any possible US intervention would be substantially
heightened. By December 2009, the PLA had deployed between 1,050 and
1,150 CSS-6/7 short-range ballistic missiles to units opposite Taiwan. (15)
China’s preparations for deterring or defeating possible US intervention in
the Taiwan Strait have intensified Taiwan’s perceptions of a rising military
threat from China.
Given Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is a part of China, using military force
against a Taiwan that Beijing views as falling internally within its own bor-
ders has always been an option. Although the military threat to Taiwan has
increased dramatically over the years as China has deployed around 1,150
ballistic missiles along the Taiwan Strait, the PRC has gradually changed its
policy strategy towards Taiwan in recent years. (16) The evolution of Beijing’s
policy towards Taiwan has been described by one ROC analyst as “more
carrot than stick.” (17)
The shift in China’s military approach
towards Taiwan
As China’s policy towards Taiwan has changed from a tougher approach
during the Jiang Zemin era to a more moderate approach under Hu Jintao
today, the role of military force has been correspondingly downgraded in
terms of prominence, although by no means abandoned. This change is
largely tactical, since Beijing’s ultimate goal of eventual re-unification
under the one China principle remains unchanged.
Reasons for the change in policy approach have never been formally dis-
closed by Beijing. Nevertheless, reasonable speculation is possible. On the
one hand, military exercises in the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis and the
hawkish remarks made by Premier Zhu Rongji immediately before Taiwan’s
2000 Presidential election all backfired, and Taiwan people were alienated
despite the fact that a trend for “Taiwan independence” did not come
about. The backfiring of a forceful policy by Beijing could be seen as early
as in the landslide victory of Lee Teng-hui in Taiwan’s 1996 Presidential
election.
On the other hand, China’s diplomatic environment also suffered from its
forceful approach to Taiwan in the late 1990s. The “China threat” theory
emerged as a result of the hawkish behaviour exhibited by the PLA, and
this served to isolate China by encouraging the US to develop closer secu-
rity ties with Taiwan and to strengthen the US-Japan alliance. It was also
detrimental to China’s goal of building better relations with its neighbour-
ing countries, particularly those in Southeast Asia.
As such, the hardline policy had largely failed to achieve its aims, and had
to be changed. This change coincided with the transition from Jiang Zemin
to Hu Jintao. (18) As the leading figure of the fourth generation of CCP lead-
ers, Hu took control over the party, state, and military step-by-step from
Jiang between the years 2002 and 2005. During this period, Taiwan-China
relations also embarked on a new trajectory with the revival of CCP-KMT
cooperation marked by the visit of then-KMT chairman Lien Chan to China
in 2005. (19) The completion of Beijing’s power transition and Lien’s visit to
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China represented a milestone in terms of China’s military posture in its
Taiwan policy, allowing China to move Taiwan policy from a hard to a soft
approach, while still refusing to abandon the option of using military
means against Taiwan in order to block Taiwan independence.
For instance, Hu’s keynote speech before the 17th Party Congress in 2007
greatly soft-pedalled the Taiwan issue, and did not mention the mantra of
opposing Taiwan’s independence and two Chinas. (20) Again, in his Political
Report at the 17th Party Congress, Hu offered Taiwan the opportunity to
negotiate a peace accord. (21) The changes in China’s approach toward Tai-
wan under Hu laid the foundation for the later dramatic improved atmos-
phere in cross-Strait relations. There are several significant dimensions
worth noting in the shift in China’s Taiwan policy since the Jiang-Hu tran-
sition of leadership.
Militarily, Beijing reduced its public emphasis on the potential use of
force against Taiwan. Military tension flared up three times during the Jiang
era in 1995, 1996, and 1999. By contrast, no such incidents have happened
under Hu Jintao. Instead, Beijing has stressed non-military approaches to
deal with Taiwan, and in a sense, Beijing has adjusted its means to influ-
ence Taiwan softly and comprehensively. For instance, the much-touted
Dongshan Island military exercises previously held annually near the Tai-
wan Strait ceased in 2005, after having been scaled down in 2004. In re-
sponse, Taipei announced the cancellation of the Han Kuang drill sched-
uled for 9 September 2004. (22) Further, PLA amphibious and airborne exer-
cises perceived as simulated attacks on Taiwan have been held elsewhere,
a step aimed at reducing the provocative nature of the drills.
This does not mean Beijing has given up the military approach, but rather
that it prefers to stress softer approaches, even while still regarding the use
of force as a last option. In 2007, Hu pointed out that the main mission of
the PLA is to win a war with Taiwan, but also noted that attacking the is-
land would cause several negative results, including damaging economic
development along China’s southeast coast, impairing Beijing’s foreign re-
lations, harming foreign investment in China, causing causalities, and push-
ing back the progress of China’s national modernisation. (23)
Although Hu proclaimed the tough-sounding “Anti-Secession Law”
(ASL) (24) in 2005 to guard against the prospect of a declaration of Taiwan
independence, and although the law was widely perceived as a step toward
preparing the legal grounds for war against Taiwan, the law was actually
meant more as a step to unshackle the hands of China’s Taiwan affairs ex-
perts to promote cross-Strait engagement free from hawkish internal op-
position than as an attempt to intimidate Taiwan, even if Taiwan was fur-
ther antagonised and alienated as a result. In other words, the ratification
of the ASL served two goals: it sought to hold off any potential criticism of
Hu’s new Taiwan policy on the one hand, while at the same time attempt-
ing to buy time for a new approach aimed at winning the hearts and minds
of Taiwanese people for the ultimate goal of political re-unification.
Hu’s new Taiwan policy could also be demonstrated in his handling of
Beijing-Washington-Taipei relations. The new approach has been to re-
strain Taiwan’s independence via Washington diplomatically, rather than to
constrain Taipei directly and militarily. This was in sharp contrast to the
Jiang Zemin era, during which Beijing’s sensitivity to Taiwan separatism led
it to launch missile tests in the Taiwan Strait before the Taiwan presidential
election in 1996. By contrast, Hu Jintao looked to Washington to rein in
behaviour by Taiwan that it considered destabilising.
For instance, during the 2004 presidential election campaign, Beijing un-
expectedly did not resort to military intimidation or even verbal attacks.
Rather, as Chen stressed Taiwan independence and referendum issues on
several occasions, Beijing encouraged Washington to admonish him while
remaining silent itself. This change reflected the increased importance
China has assigned to the US in its approach to constraining Taiwan. Bei-
jing has changed its policy vis-à-vis Taipei from acting directly across the
Strait to acting on Taipei indirectly through pressure exerted by Washing-
ton.
Hu Jintao’s changed approach toward Taiwan could be observed in other
areas as well. In the white paper China’s National Defense in 2008 released
on 20 January 2009, (25) more than six months after Taiwan President Ma
Ying-jeou (馬英九 ) took office, Beijing stressed that the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait have made progress in consultations under the common po-
litical framework of the “1992 Consensus.” (26) China took a further step in
its 2010 defence white paper, which proposed that Taipei and Beijing initi-
ate talks about a “military security trust mechanism.” (27)
Briefly, under Hu Jintao, China’s approach to Taiwan has become decid-
edly more patient and less aggressive in response to Taiwan’s de-empha-
sising of the independence issue. Beijing’s attitude nowadays is softer,
more proactive, and more flexible in engaging Taiwan economically, so-
cially, and culturally. This has greatly reduced Taiwanese analysts’ percep-
tions of threat from mainland China.
Taiwan’s military approaches toward the
decreasing likelihood of conflict
For the purpose of safeguarding Taiwan’s military security from China’s
military threat, Taiwan’s orientation of military strategy had long fo-
cused on a “defence-in-depth” strategy during the Lee Teng-hui era
(1988-2000). The strategy was heavily influenced by the former ROC
Chief of Staff, General Hau Pei-tsun’s (郝柏村 ) operational concept of a
“decisive military campaign at the water’s edge” ( jue zhan tan tou 決戰
灘頭 ). (28) The concept mainly stemmed from Hau’s assessment that it
would be extremely difficult for the ROC armed forces to gain com-
mand of the air and sea over the Taiwan Strait, while mainland China
could not conquer Taiwan without first landing on the island’s beaches,
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and that by so doing it would suffer great casualties at the hands of Tai-
wan’s ground forces. (29)
The assumption behind Gen. Hau’s operational strategy was that given
Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, it would not be appropriate for Taiwan to
launch a pre-emptive strike, strategically or tactically, against Mainland
China for fear of losing political support from allied and neighbouring
countries. This implied that Taiwan could only take action after absorbing
China’s initial operational actions against it.
Further, despite the fact that Taiwan had a certain edge over China in
terms of operational capabilities, Taiwan could not long sustain a war of at-
trition against China. As such, Taiwan had to preserve its ability to react
after absorbing China’s first strikes in the opening stage of the conflict. In
order to do so, before China could launch any action against Taiwan, Tai-
wan’s jet fighters and warships would have to be pulled back to the east of
Taiwan so that they could be preserved. Operational action could then be
executed after surviving China’s opening attack. This explains why the Chi-
ashan Air Force Base in Hualien and the Su’ao Naval Base were built fol-
lowing the late 1980s.
Gen. Hau’s concept was further adopted in the 1996 National Defence
Report (NDR), and the terms used to describe Taiwan’s military strategy
were fangwei gusou youxiao hezu (防衛固守,有效嚇阻 solid defence, ef-
fective deterrence). (30) The concept was given official definition in the
1998 NDR. It was defined as “a kind of defensive deterrence” aimed at dis-
suading opponents from attacking by convincing them that the cost of
using military force will outweigh the gains they might get from employ-
ing force of arms. (31)
Broadly speaking, the 1995/1996 Taiwan missile tests demonstrated that
China’s ballistic missiles could easily penetrate Taiwan’s layered defences
and cause significant damage to the island, potentially rendering counter-
operations by Taiwan ineffective. The crisis exposed critical shortcomings in
Taiwan’s “defence-in-depth” strategy, and called into question the validity
of continuing to rely on such an approach. The strategy was subsequently
questioned by many civilians and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leg-
islators, including future president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁 ). (32) In order to
diffuse potential criticism over not being able to defend against a potential
missile attack by China, Taiwan rushed to procure missile defence systems
from the US and initiated several programs for developing indigenous cruise
and ballistic missiles under the instruction of then-President Lee Teng-hui.
The DPP’s military strategy and operational doctrine
The Chen Shui-bian administration amended Taiwan’s traditional military
strategy and operational doctrine during the period 2000-2008. The tradi-
tional military strategy was reversed from “solid defence, effective deter-
rence” (fangwei gushou, youxiao hezu) to “effective deterrence, solid de-
fence” (youxiao hezu, fangwei gushou). (33) Behind this inversion lay a new
perception of the value of space in the Strait. In brief, whereas “solid de-
fence” refers to traditional concepts of ground warfare, “effective deter-
rence” refers to air, naval, and information counter-measure capabilities. (34)
This inversion was very significant in terms of defence resource allocation:
it entailed a boost to the status of the navy, the air force, and units dedi-
cated to information operations and information warfare while downgrad-
ing the role of the army.
Chen’s administration also put forward a new operational doctrine of
“fighting the decisive military campaign beyond the border” ( jue zhan jing
wai 決戰境外 ) in line with the new military strategy. In declaring the new
doctrine on 16 June 2000 during a speech at the National Military Acad-
emy, Chen said that Taiwan must develop military capabilities including
“high precision strikes, early warning capability and intelligence superiority,
basing itself on the objective of winning a decisive battle outside our ter-
ritory.” (35) The new doctrine tried to accomplish several goals, including
seizing the initiative as quickly as possible in response to a Chinese attack;
destroying Chinese forces at sea and in the air before they reach the
beaches; and launching precision deep strikes at PLA command and con-
trol centres, logistics and support nodes, airbases, and other military tar-
gets on the mainland. (36)
Chen’s new approach to the defence of Taiwan caused heated debate in
Taiwan and China. For China, the new military strategy and operation doc-
trine were perceived as provocative, with many mainland analysts seeing
it against the backdrop of President Bush’s large arms sales package as ev-
idence of a conspiracy between Taiwan and the Bush administration to up-
grade security relations and prepare the way for Taiwan independence.
Debates in Taiwan centred on the implications of preparing for war-fight-
ing efforts “beyond the borders,” as well as the role and function of differ-
ent services in the new strategy. Gen. Hau Pei-tsun was one of those who
adamantly opposed the new approach to defending the ROC. One ques-
tion was whether or not Taiwan had the capacity to launch a truly “deci-
sive” military campaign, with Gen. Hau arguing that “decisive” campaigns
could only be launched by stronger powers against weaker powers rather
than the other way around. This line of analysis implied that Taiwan, as the
weaker power, should pursue a strategy of protracted warfare with the aim
of preserving as many capabilities as possible for the final campaign
against the enemy’s landing forces once they arrived on Taiwan’s coastal
beaches. (37)
Another debate involved how to assign the roles of the different military
services in defending Taiwan. For Gen. Hau, the priority should be on air su-
periority and sea denial, but the goal is to preserve strength for strategi-
cally protracted warfare. If decisive campaign is launched by employing air
and naval force at the outset of the campaign, Hau worried that Taiwan’s
defence capabilities would be totally exhausted at the opening stages of
any cross-Strait conflict. (38) A final argument focused on whether or not
the ROC armed forces could or should conduct a campaign beyond Tai-
wan’s borders. Again, Gen. Hau adamantly opposed the idea of a campaign
beyond the border, arguing that it implied a proactive and pre-emptive at-
tack on the mainland, a mission beyond Taiwan military’s capability.
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Taiwan gradually reoriented its defence strategy following Chen’s elec-
tion in 2000, and two years later the National Defense Report 2002 em-
phasised the goal of building up Taiwan’s counterstrike capabilities by
transforming the ROC’s traditional operational doctrine from “maintaining
command of the air and sea, conducting anti-landing” to “maintaining
command of the air and sea, conducting defensive ground operations, and
maximising joint combat capabilities.” (39) According to the National De-
fense Report 2004’s comprehensive description of the “Active Defence”
strategy, counterstrikes would include information operations, electronic
warfare, long-range precision strikes, air and naval forces, and special oper-
ations. The objective of the counterstrikes would be to “rapidly paralyze
the enemy’s critical nodes and delay its invading operation tempo, so as to
disrupt its ambition of winning a decisive victory in the first battle and
swiftly ending the war.” (40) Under the DPP’s idea of active defence, the
mass production of Hsiung Feng (HF)-2E land-attack cruise missiles be-
came a vital aspect of Taiwan’s military modernisation and strategic de-
fence capabilities.
In addition, every military exercise and training event undertaken during
the DPP era was designed to tackle scenarios focused on possible PLA ac-
tion against Taiwan and countering the PLA’s new capabilities. After the
1995-1996 crisis, the PLA started to focus on acquiring capabilities appli-
cable to Taiwan scenarios, including improved Special Operations Forces,
enhanced reconnaissance and surveillance units, and increased amphibious
training. These units are being trained and equipped not only to conduct
an amphibious invasion, but also to support naval and airborne strikes
against Taiwan, including: (1) reconnaissance and targeting; (2) small-scale
strike missions, such as decapitation efforts; (3) battle damage assess-
ments; and (4) attacks on civilian infrastructure and military facilities.
In order to deal with the threat posed by Chinese missile attacks and/or
decapitation operations, Taiwan improved its military exercises designed to
assess training and readiness. Every year, Taiwan’s premier annual military
exercise, the Han Kuang exercise, is premised on the defence of Taiwan
against various kinds of PLA attacks, including responding to threats to the
island’s air defences; anti-amphibious and anti-airborne assault operations;
anti-submarine warfare; air-ground integration warfare; counter-terrorism;
defence of civilian and urban infrastructure warfare; information warfare
(IW) and counter-IW; reserve command integration; and Taiwan Air Force
use of non-airfield sites. Additionally, smaller exercises have focused on
counter-terrorism, reserve force mobilisation, and anti-decapitation drills.
In spite of these changes in defence posture, debate continues within Tai-
wan over the most appropriate military strategy and operational doctrine
for the ROC. Can China be deterred from taking military action against Tai-
wan? Since it is completely unrealistic to pursue a true military balance in
the Taiwan Strait, many ROC-based analysts argue for developing an
asymmetric equilibrium, in which the US is the balancer and Taiwan de-
pends on American investment and military support to deter China.
Taiwan’s Military Strategy and Operational Doctrine
since 2008
With regard to military strategy, the Ma Ying-jeou administration re-
turned to the pre-Chen Shui-bian era defence strategy, emphasising “solid
defence and effective deterrence.” This reversion was written into the 2009
Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) and 2009 National Defence Report
(NDR). (41) The interpretation is that when war is inevitable, the military
should maximise joint operational capabilities, incorporate all-out defence
capabilities, and engage in homeland defence, in order to reject, repel, and
eliminate enemy forces and ensure national security. (42)
This strategy has also been referred to as a “Hard ROC” strategy. The
2009 QDR stipulates that Taiwan’s defence planning is guided by a strategy
of “Solid as Bedrock” ( gu ruo pan shi 固若磐石 ) approach to homeland de-
fence focused on: (1) war prevention, (2) homeland defence, (3) contin-
gency response, (4) conflict avoidance, and (5) regional stability. (43) Though
there is no operational doctrine derived from this strategy, it does imply
that solid defence is the major means to accomplish effective deterrence,
and that in the wake of the revolution in military affairs, a joint operation
by all three services and social sectors has become necessary for executing
solid defence. (44)
Under the Ma administration’s approach to defending the ROC, air supe-
riority and sea denial capabilities aim to delay, slow down, and repel
China’s military operation after absorbing the PLA’s opening attack, and
are intended to support a decisive military campaign on the beaches when
the enemy is most vulnerable. Information and cyber operations are not
ignored in employing this traditional doctrine, and play a role in weakening
the PLA’s ability to leverage information in support of war-fighting opera-
tions. (45) The concept of a “Hard ROC” strategy also emphasises increasing
the fortification and emplaced defences of the island. (46)
Despite the fact that the Ma administration has decided on a defen-
sively-oriented strategy, it has continued to focus on producing advanced
ballistic and cruise missiles that can augment deterrence by threatening
unacceptably painful retaliation against the mainland. For instance, both
the 2009 QDR and the 2009 NDR suggest that Taiwan should keep
strengthening and developing defensive counter-measures and asymmet-
ric capabilities to fight against the enemy’s centre of gravity. (47) As a con-
sequence, the budget for developing the HF-2E missile has been main-
tained since 2008. In fact, while the production of ballistic and cruise mis-
siles under the Chen administration was seen by Beijing as provocative be-
cause they could be used to support the pursuit of Taiwan independence,
they do not appear to elicit similar anxieties today because the Ma admin-
istration does not publicly challenge China’s bottom-line one-China prin-
ciple. (48)
If defence policy is an extension of politics, President Ma’s military strat-
egy is in line with his overall security policy. On May 13, 2011 when Ma
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held a teleconference with the Washington, DC-based Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), he laid out his “Three Lines of Defence”
( san dao fan xian 三道防線 ) security policy for ensuring the peace and
prosperity of Taiwan. (49) According to Ma, the three lines are: 1) to develop
institutionalised mechanisms for dealing with China; (50) 2) to demonstrate
to the global community Taiwan’s national strength and soft power as a
peacemaker and a provider of humanitarian aid; (51) and 3) to combine
diplomacy and defence to win more international support. During his CSIS
talk, Ma argued that although defence comes third in this sequence, it re-
mains critical, citing Sun Tzu’s argument that the best defence is to employ
strategy, followed by diplomacy, with reliance on force as the worst op-
tion. (52)
A further observation is that Taiwan cannot afford to compete with China
militarily due to Taiwan’s small economic size. In this circumstance, Tai-
wan’s best strategy is to focus its deterrent efforts as non-provocatively as
possible on the Mainland’s centre of gravity so that China can be deterred
without being provoked, and Taiwan’s economy can continue to develop
while de facto political independence can be sustained.
Taiwan’s military modernisation and CBMs
with China
In spite of the fact that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are moving in a
more pragmatic and mutually-beneficial direction, Beijing has never given
up its military preparations against Taiwan. (53) China has been rigorously
developing state-of-the-art technologies and weapon systems, such as
anti-satellite weapons, aircraft carriers, DF-16 and DF-21 ballistic mis-
siles, (54) the J-20 stealth fighter jet, (55) advanced submarines, and large air
and sea transport vehicles with the aim of establishing A2/AD capabilities.
This was reconfirmed by comments by Chinese Defence Minister Liang
Guanglie, who told a delegation from the Japan Self-Defence Force on 11
June 2010 that the “center of gravity for China’s military development is
Taiwan affairs.” (56)
Cross-Strait relations may have stabilised in recent years, but Taiwan’s se-
curity still depends very heavily on the continued support of the US. Fol-
lowing the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, Taiwan’s military budgets between
1995 and 1999 averaged roughly US$ 9 billion per year, which accounted
for about 3.3 percent of GDP per year and 22.7 percent of annual govern-
ment outlays. During the two terms of the Chen administration, Taiwan’s
annual defence budget decreased to just 2.5 percent of GDP per year, while
averaging approximately US$ 8.8 billion per year, or 17 percent of total an-
nual government spending per year. Over the past three years of the Ma
Ying-jeou administration, Taiwan’s defence budget has consistently de-
clined from US$10.5 billion in 2008, to US$ 9.6 billion in 2009, to US$ 9.3
billion in 2010. The trend of Taiwan’s shrinking military budget might limit
Taiwan’s ability to support military research and development, a poten-
tially troubling development for Washington if it implies growing ROC re-
liance on the United States. (57)
With American support, in 2005 Chen announced the goal of reversing
the declining spending trendlines and increasing the military budget to 3
percent of GDP by 2008. Washington encouraged Taiwan to boost its de-
fence spending, and to concentrate on the challenges of hardening and
sustaining forces. (58) Since his election in 2008, Ma promised to sustain
military budgets at 3 percent of GDP, a commitment reaffirmed in QDR
2009, though this has proven difficult. Despite the relatively small size of
Taiwan’s military budget, it continues to seek to purchase weaponry from
the US with the goal of building a smaller and leaner deterrent force in
order to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait.
Currently, Taiwan is seeking to transform the ROC armed forces into a
smaller, more modernised and more professional force for homeland de-
fence. (59) With improved relations across the Taiwan Strait in recent years,
Taiwan has set the goal of turning its military into an all-volunteer service
by the end of 2014. With the goal of building an all-volunteer military, Tai-
wan looks forward to building a small but strong elite force that will offer
a “Solid Defence and Effective Deterrence.” Redefining its new direction,
Taiwan cannot compete with China in the arms race. Winning is no longer
a matter of “an all-out elimination of enemies” but rather of “defending
every inch of the territory by expelling the enemies from landing,” accord-
ing to the 2009 NDR. (60)
At present, the ROC Army has approximately 200,000 personnel
equipped with 1960s-era M-48H Brave Tiger tanks equipped with up-
graded sensors and electronics; M-60A3 main battle tanks; and newer M-
113 armoured personnel carriers. (61) Much of the Army’s tube artillery is
towed, while it also deploys a variety of multiple rocket launchers, includ-
ing the Ray Ting-2000, which is a domestic variant of the American M-270
Multiple Launch Rocket System. Its fleet of AH-1W Cobra attack helicop-
ters is being supplemented with the AH-64D Apache equipped with the
Longbow radar system, and it is expected to get UH-60 Blackhawk trans-
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port helicopters in the near future. (62) The ROC Air Force has about 45,000
personnel and fields 450 fighter-bombers, ranging from obsolescent F-5
fighters to the Ching-kuo Indigenous Defence Fighter (IDF), and about 200
F-16A/B and Mirage 2000 fighters combined. (63) The proposed sale of 66
F-16 C/D fighters would replace and allow the phasing out of the aging F-
5 fighters. (64) The ROC Navy (ROCN) has 45,000 personnel and is mostly
equipped with retired US naval vessels, including four Kidd-class destroyers
armed with Harpoon anti-ship missiles and SM-2 medium-range surface-
to-air missiles. The ROCN has 22 frigates, which will be supplemented with
eight Perry-class frigates armed with a mix of anti-submarine and anti-
ship weapons systems and more than 69 fast-attack craft equipped with
anti-ship missiles. (65)
Missiles are high priority items in Taiwan’s military development. These
include anti-ship cruise missiles, such as HF-2E missiles, and missile de-
fence system such as PAC-3 Patriot and Tien Kung surface-to-air missile
systems manned by the Army. Besides, Taiwan is expected to mass produce
a powerful Wan Chien air-to-surface missile system designed to nip a Chi-
nese invasion in the bud by striking airfields and harbours on the main-
land. (66) Notably, Taiwan presented the indigenous HF-III missiles on the
same day that China began sea trials of its first aircraft carrier, by describ-
ing the missile as a “carrier killer” which has been deployed on Taiwan’s
Perry-class frigates. (67)
New security perceptions and changed military role
since May 2008
Paradoxically, notwithstanding China’s continued military build-up over
the past several years, Taiwan’s perception is that the likelihood of military
conflict with China is quite low, both now and for the foreseeable fu-
ture. (68) This perception has prevailed since the election of Ma Ying-jeou,
and can be attributed to several factors, including perceptions of China’s
near-term intentions and an improved understanding of China’s red-lines
derived from China’s new Taiwan policy, its leaders’ growing realisation of
Taiwan’s complicated domestic politics, and the US’s determination to
continue to play an important role in the Asia-Pacific region.
Along with the perceived declining likelihood of military conflict in the
Taiwan Strait, hopes over the possibility of using confidence-building
measures and ending hostility in the Taiwan Strait have grown over the
past few years. The purpose of employing such measures would be to de-
velop stable and predictable patterns of behaviour that both sides could
use to gauge intentions, avoid accidental conflict, and maintain the peace.
Furthermore, some Taiwan observers have raised the idea of developing co-
operation with the mainland in the field of non-traditional security, includ-
ing combating transnational crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, pandemic
disease, disaster relief, and humanitarian rescue. These areas are less polit-
ically sensitive and could provide experience working collaboratively be-
fore moving on to more challenging bilateral defence issues.
The Typhoon Morakot disaster of 8 August 2009 was a turning point for
the development of Taiwan’s military. Since the disaster, Taiwan’s armed
forces have been charged with preparing not only for traditional threats
from China, but also for dealing with non-traditional security missions
such as disaster relief and counter-terrorism. (69) The political consequences
of the Ma administration’s perceived mishandling of the relief operations
led directly to a rise in pressure on the defence establishment to develop
the ability to respond to natural disasters, which may entail some trade-
offs between preparations for traditional combat operations and prepara-
tions for disaster relief. Even though the Taiwan government insists that
enhancing combat operations and maintaining deterrent capabilities re-
main the military’s first priorities, readiness for disaster relief is clearly
emerging as a core mission for Taiwan’s armed forces as well, with some
commentators arguing that natural disasters pose a greater threat than
the military of the PLA. (70)
In addition to focusing on defensive-oriented strategies and non-tradi-
tional missions such as disaster relief, the Ma administration has also
begun to explore possible confidence-building measures (CBMs) across the
Taiwan Strait. To date, most of the CBM experiences of Taipei and Beijing
have consisted of unilateral steps involving unilateral declarations and re-
sponses of limited reciprocity. For example, Ma’s decision to de-emphasise
independence issues and his pledge of “Three No’s” can be considered de-
claratory confidence-building measures, as can his declaration in his inau-
gural speech that he was prepared to negotiate with Beijing based on the
“1992 consensus.”
For China’s part, its 2010 defence white paper not only stressed the im-
portance of the “1992 consensus” in cross-Strait relations, but also pointed
out that “the two sides may discuss political relations in the special situa-
tion that China is not yet reunified in a pragmatic manner. The two sides
can hold contacts and exchanges on military issues at an appropriate time
and talk about a military security mechanism of mutual trust, in a bid to
act together to adopt measures to further stabilise cross-Strait relations
and ease concerns regarding military security.” (71) This was the first time
that Beijing publicly stated that two sides of the Strait could explore the
establishment of military security trust under the one-China principle.
Conclusion
Since the late 1980s, Taiwanese perceptions of military threat from China
have risen and fallen, and these shifting perceptions have to a significant
extent reflected changes in China’s overall cross-Strait policy. Prior to 1993,
when Chinese policy emphasised peaceful re-unification under the “one
country, two systems” approach and the two sides were engaged in bilat-
eral discussions, perceptions in Taiwan of a military threat from China were
muted. After 1993, when China launched a series of military exercises
aimed at preventing the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administrations
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Special feature
from pursuing “Taiwan independence,” perceptions of a military threat from
China heightened. After Hu Jintao took power in 2002 and adopted a more
moderate policy toward Taiwan, perceptions of a Chinese military threat
once again declined. This perception has held up in spite of the fact that the
Chinese military is undertaking a comprehensive military modernisation ef-
fort and has placed more than a thousand missiles across from Taiwan.
Taiwan’s force posture and procurement policies have evolved in re-
sponse to Taiwan’s perceptions of the threat posed by China. The switch in
military strategy and operational doctrine from “solid defence and effec-
tive deterrence” and “defence in depth” to “effective deterrence and solid
defence” and “decisive campaign beyond territory” during the Chen Shui-
bian era was an example of how Taiwan’s defence strategy has evolved in
light of the challenges posed by China’s military power.
It is worth reiterating that the more moderate policy line toward Taiwan
taken by China under the Hu administration does not in any way imply a
shift in the PRC’s ultimate policy of achieving reunification with Taiwan.
The adoption of a more moderate policy line by Beijing was made in re-
sponse to the backlash against the mainland’s more hawkish behaviour
during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis and to comport with China’s strat-
egy of emphasising its peaceful rise and peaceful development.
Irrespective of the reasons for its adoption, Hu’s more moderate Taiwan
policy line has certainly had a deep impact on Taiwan’s security percep-
tions, as many observers’ perceptions of a military threat from China have
declined despite the mainland’s continued military modernisation and
growing deployment of missiles opposite Taiwan. Reflecting these muted
security concerns vis-à-vis the mainland, one recent poll showed that only
10.1 percent of Taiwanese surveyed were worried about the possibility of
military conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the near future. (72)
How long such perceptions of a relatively benign cross-Strait security en-
vironment can persist while fundamental political differences remain be-
tween Taiwan and China is an open question. One element that may com-
plicate efforts to maintain the cross-Strait status quo stems from shifts in
public identity in Taiwan. Despite the growing closeness in economic ties
between Taiwan and China under President Ma Ying-jeou after he took of-
fice in May 2008, the percentage of respondents identifying themselves in
opinion surveys as “Taiwanese” has continued to climb, from 48.4 percent
in 2008 to 54.2 percent in 2011; during the same period, the proportion of
respondents who identified themselves as “Chinese” fell to around 4 per-
cent. (73) Furthermore, widespread polling data shows that the number of
those advocating the status quo (both a permanent status quo and tem-
porary status quo) (74) continues to grow, from 57.3 percent in 2008 to 60.1
percent in June 2011. (75) These figures imply that China’s moderate policy
probably has not achieved everything that its authors have hoped.
What implication can be drawn from the analysis above? It is probably
safe to say that although relations between Taiwan and China have im-
proved under President Ma Ying-jeou, as long as fundamental political dif-
ferences remain between Taiwan and China, and the mainland does not re-
nounce the use of force, the possibility of armed conflict will remain, and
Taiwanese perceptions of a military threat from China will not disappear
completely.
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